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Abstract
We de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1 Introduction
Wise leaders always put the good of their own people and their own country rst. [...] The future
does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots.This is what Trump declared in
his third-ever address to the United Nations General Assembly in favour of his "America First"
policies. Buying U.S. made products has been changed by America rst in a sign of loyalty
toward U.S. rather than in a consumption choice. Along the same rationale, one can view the
Greek campaign entitled "s/he who insists wins" during austerity (or "!    ).
It was based on the idea that insisting to buy Greek could be a way-out from crisis. Similar
campaigns, "Compras made in Spain" or "Buy Irish", have been developed in the other so-called
PIIGS, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Buying local is intended as a form of ethical
consumption by environmentalists. Their argument is that reducing food miles for delivering
products is one of the most e¤ective tools for abating emissions.
Whatever its source, consumption home bias is a global and a well documented phenomenon
in existing empirical literature (see for instance Chen, 2004 and Morey, 2016). Surprisingly, there
is no formal model explaining this issue. In this paper, we propose an international duopoly
model that captures the market e¤ects of home bias. There are several causes advanced to explain
the existence of consumption home bias. First, it is often assumed that home bias arises due
to the willingness of protecting local employment that otherwise would be reduced in favor of
foreign workers. Another reason evoked would be that information about the quality of the
domestic products is better than the one obtained on foreign ones. Furthermore, it is argued
that geographical frictions generating important trade costs hinder trade and favor local goods.
Moreover, consuming local goods has become a campaign of environmentalistsmovements who
argue that transportation of goods is one of the most polluting activities.
We believe that a major force behind consumption home bias is driven by a cultural component.
As a reaction against a borderless world, nationalist movements push forward the idea of ethnic
and national identities. With the aim of preserving the traditional values of a country, they
tend to generate di¢ dence and refusal of others and to emphasize cross-country di¤erences. "In
general, the concept of ethnocentrism represents the universal inclination of people to view their
own group as the center of the universe, to interpret other social groups from the perspective of
their own group, and to reject individuals who are culturally dissimilar while blindly accepting those
who are culturally like themselves. The symbols and values of ones own ethnic or national group
become objects of pride and attachment, whereas symbols of other groups may become objects of
contempt" (Shimp and Sharma, 280, 1987). A particular illustration of such "populist" views is
reected in consumer ethnocentrism. Under consumer ethnocentrism, goods become a means to
conrm a culture, a sense of place (Cresswell, 2005). Ethnocentric consumers attribute a moral
meaning to consumption: purchasing foreign products is viewed as a blameworthy behavior as it
would generate a dangerous mix of cultures thereby weakening the ethnic identity of a country.
Of course, conferring to goods a moral, social and cultural content adds to the typical drivers of
consumption - price and quality of products - a further dimension, opening the door to a priori
unexpected market congurations.
In this paper, we push forward the hypothesis that home bias may cause ethnocentric con-
sumption. This attitude is manifested when consumers possess relative preferences, so that their
satisfaction is related to the consumption choice of their peers.1 These preferences make goods
1Consumers have relative preferences when they strive for a relative position among peers. This implies that
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conspicuous products since while meeting some material needs, they also confer to their buyers
a social position along a social ladder and satisfy some sense of place in a community. In this
perspective, consumers may choose more expensive items which at rst sight do not provide a
better intrinsic quality or performance than cheaper alternatives. These goods are chosen mainly
because of their conspicuous nature. When consuming these items, people feel to belong to a
social group. They are aware to obtain a cultural or ethnic identity, putting them far away from
foreign citizens. For this identity, they are eventually willing to pay a price premium.2
We provide a theoretical setting that captures key features of ethnocentric consumption and
analyze their consequences on market prices and quantities. The key question of our analysis is
how a market equilibrium is dened when international trade conicts with ethnocentric consump-
tion. This conict arises since trade is meant to develop cross-border exchanges of goods whereas
ethnocentric consumption favors domestic consumption. This analysis seems particularly relevant
when foreign and domestic goods display signicant quality di¤erences: it is along these goods
features that consumer ethnocentrism develops, citizens in each country identifying the quality of
the good with the "quality" of the country they belong to.
To explore this issue, we dene a partial equilibriummodel with two countries and two vertically
di¤erentiated goods, a high and a low quality good.3 Consumers in each country are heterogenous
with respect to their willingness to pay for quality. Each country is populated by a rm. Each
rm exports its product thereby facing trade costs. We assume that consumers in both countries
attribute a social content to the goods. In particular, they thrive additional satisfaction when
consuming a domestic good rather than a foreign one, since only the former can satisfy their sense
of place. By contrast, they su¤er a psychological penalty if they consume the foreign product.
Borrowing from the literature of conspicuous consumption, we capture the social benet and the
social penalty through the quality gap between variants.
Accordingly, under the assumption of relative and country-specic preferences, we characterize
the equilibrium conguration of the international duopoly. In particular, we rst describe the role
of these preferences in capturing the ethnocentric consumption by comparing this equilibrium with
a baseline where relative preferences are absent. Second, we compare the two equilibria arising
with and without ethnocentric consumption. Finally, we study the e¤ect of a trade cost reduction
on the equilibrium conguration. We nd that consumption home bias may have unexpected
e¤ects on equilibrium prices as compared with these prices which would arise in the classical
vertical di¤erentiation model.
Our analysis develops along several research lines. The key ingredient that consumers have a
social identity stems from Tajfel and Turner (1979)s pioneering contribution to psychology. They
formulate a process for a social identity to be dened so that people are put into categories and
then they are contrasted with other groups, thereby generating a sense of place. This perspective
is at rst sight far from the mainstream view in economics postulating the existence of a rational
consumers relate satisfaction from their own consumption to the consumption of the others (Akerlof 1997 and the
literature on the other regarding preferences). The formal treatment of relative preferences can be found in Section
4 of this paper.
2Since Veblen (1899), in the theory of conspicuous consumption the utility (or status) of a consumer depends
on the comparison between her own consumption decision and that of others. Under conspicuous consumption,
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for a variant of lower intrinsic quality but of better in signalling their
wealth or other specic characteristics.
3A good survey of the industrial organisation models nested with international trade is Krugman (1989).
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and selsh agent with given preferences. Still, it has opened the door among economists to the
analysis of social interaction in shaping collective values, preferences and economic behavior. In
90s Akerlof introduces the notion of social decision in economic theory and describe the process
through which people choose their position in a social space.4 In a companion stream of literature
on endogenous preferences, Bowles (1998) analyses the e¤ects of institution on preferences, which
are considered to be endogenously determined. Later, Benabou and Tirole (2006) emphasize the
role of beliefs as drivers for a pro-social behavior.
Starting from these contributions, we shift the focus of our analysis on the e¤ect of social
identity on economic choices when trade coexists with an ethnocentric culture.5 Finally, in order
to give a formal content to the analysis, we use the method adopted by Ben Elhadj et al. (2015).
In their setting of vertical di¤erentiation à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979), consumers value a good according to one dimension that is its intrinsic quality. Here the
consumersvaluation not only depends on the intrinsic quality but also on a further country-specic
component capturing consumersethnocentric feelings in the country.
Last, our paper is related to existing literature on quality and international trade. Quality and
trade literature has considerably expanded since the seminal paper by Linder (1961) showing that
product quality matters in the trade patterns among trading partners (Hummels and Klenow,
2005; Verhoogen, 2008; Khandelwal, 2010; Hallak and Schott, 2011; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011;
Fajgebaum et al, 2011). Existing papers have also analyzed how trade liberalization a¤ects quality
choice when countries are asymmetric (Cabrales and Motta, 2001). The focus of our paper is on
preferences with home bias and how they interplay with trade costs.
We proceed as follows. We present the model in Section 2 and the description of the setup
without home bias in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider home-bias with other-regarding prefer-
ences in both countries, whereas in Section 5, we characterize the scenario where only consumers
in the country where the high-quality good is produced display other-regarding preferences, and
then the reverse case with ethnocentric consumers being in the country where the low quality good
is produced (Section 6). Then, we conclude in Section 7.
2 The model
Consider a two-country model with two vertically di¤erentiated goods. Each country is populated
by a single rm. We label h and l each country and the corresponding rm within the country.
The h (resp. l) rm produces the high (resp. low) quality variant uH (resp. uL). The range of
quality is in the interval [u; u] where u is the highest quality level that is technologically feasible
and u > 0 is the lowest one. Production costs are assumed to be nil. Each rm can serve both
countries. When serving the foreign market, it incurs iceberg trade costs t; 1  t  0. From the
rms viewpoint, this trade cost creates a gap between the quantity produced to serve the foreign
market and the one generating prots. When t is closer to 1, trade costs are relatively low and the
quantity produced to serve the foreign market tends to coincide with the one determining prots.
When t is close to 0, the gap between the quantity which could possibly generate prots and the
4See also Akerlof (1997), Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for a formal notion of identity, as a persons sense of self.
5The idea that consumers may be reluctant to buy foreign product is not recent. It has been introduced by
Shimp and Sharma (1987) through the notion of ethnocentrism. In their seminal paper, the authors emphasize the
role of in-group a¢ liation and belief in the morality of domestic consumption.
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one targeted to the foreign market is relevant.6
As for the demand side, in each country, consumers are characterized by their willingness to
pay for quality indexed by , uniformly distributed over the interval [a; b] : Parameter b denotes
the highest willingness to pay for quality, with b > 2a and a > a^: This guarantees that market in
both countries is covered at equilibrium both in presence and in absence of home bias.7 Assuming
that countries do not di¤er in their willingness to pay enables us to focus on the role of attitudes
toward local/foreign goods as unique driver to a change in the equilibrium conguration with
respect to a standard vertical product di¤erentiation setting.
We describe the market equilibrium of this economy when rms compete in price.
3 The baseline scenario: absence of home bias
We rst consider, as a baseline scenario, the case of open economies with rms competing in an
international duopoly and serving both the domestic market and, through export, the foreign one.
Consumers display the same preferences with respect to variants, so that their indirect utility
function Ui () writes as
Ui () =
8<:
uh   ph if she buys h
ul   pl if she buys l
0 otherwise
(1)
In line with the traditional model of vertical product di¤erentiation, the indi¤erent consumer
 (ph; pl) between buying the high quality variant or the low one; in each country i = h; l; derives
from the indi¤erence condition
uh   ph = ul   pl:
Then, the demand functions of each rm can be written as follows
xh(ph; pl) = t(b  ) +

b  

xl(ph; pl) =

   a

+ t(   a) ;
with  =
ph   pl
uh   ul :
Notice that the parameter t a¤ects the demand faced by rm i; i = h; l; in country j; j =
h; l; i 6= j; : the lower t; the lower demand in the foreign country by the domestic rm.
Maximizing prot i = pixi(pi; pj); i; j = h; l, i 6= j; of rm i yields the candidate equilibrium
prices
ph =
1
3
(2b  a) (uh   ul)
pl =
1
3
(b  2a) (uh   ul) :
6Iceberg transport costs are one of the main ingredients of modern trade and economic geography models. This
important assumption (Krugman, 1991, p.164), was introduced by Samuelson (1954). Iceberg costs are popular
because they provide a mathematically elegant and tractable way to incorporate trade costs. Iceberg costs implicitly
imply that the transportation sector does not have increasing returns to scale. In the present paper, the focus is on
the role played by a new type of preferences that embody home bias. As a consequence, we have chosen to use the
most elegant way to model transportation costs. Nonetheless, the results of this paper hold qualitatively the same
if we assume a more classical transport costs that augments the marginal cost of production. These calculations
are available upon request to the authors.
7See Appendix A for details on this inequality.
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where pl is positively signed due to the condition b > 2a: Notice that equilibrium prices do not
depend on iceberg costs which only a¤ect the quantity sold in each country.
The corresponding demands at equilibrium write as
xh =
1
3
(t+ 1) (2b  a) and xl = 13 (t+ 1) (b  2a) :
In this setting, the typical e¤ects of trade on the equilibrium conguration emerge so that the
equilibrium prices of the variants decrease and the corresponding demands raise as trade gets more
intense namely as t increases.
4 Home bias in both countries
Now, we move to a di¤erent setting where each variant is evaluated not only on the basis of
its intrinsic quality but also in term of its sociocultural content. More specically, we assume
that consumers in country h (resp. l) thrive additional satisfaction when consuming the locally
produced good h (resp. l). This good represents the national consumption culture: its buyer feel
to protect a national identity. By contrast, they incur a psychological su¤ering when consuming
the good produced in the foreign country. This su¤ering is not due to an intrinsic quality of the
variant; but to the awareness that this variant is produced by a foreign rm instead of a national
one. To formalize these ideas, we use a vertical di¤erentiation model à la Mussa and Rosen, with
relative preferences, nested with a cultural component, namely an ethnocentric attitude. Thus,
the utility function Uh () of a consumer in country h is given by
Uh () =

uh   ph + (huh   ul) if she buys h
ul   pl   (huh   ul) if she buys l : (2)
In the traditional setting of relative preferences the coe¢ cient h is equal to one and the consumer
obtains an additional utility benet or loss by the quality gap (uh ul). When introducing home
bias, namely when h > 1; the component (huh   ul) captures the additional utility benet
from consuming the national good h; or the psychological frustration from the foreign product
l: Parameter  magnies the sociocultural component, independently whether this is a benet
or a frustration. It grasps the intensity of the social feelings in the relative preference setting.
Parameter h captures home bias or ethnocentrism and it encompasses the feelings of satisfaction
or frustration generated by consuming variant h or l; respectively. We assume that  > h and
h > 1 >   0: To guarantee that the utility level of a native h consumer buying the good l is
a priori positive (i.e. ul   (huh   ul) > 0), it must hold that + uluh > h ,  < a
ul
huh ul :
Symmetrically, the utility function U l () of a consumer in l writes as
U l () =

uh   ph   (lul   uh) if she buys h
ul   pl + (lul   uh) if she buys l ; (3)
with l >
uh
ul
for lul uh > 0; uh (lul uh) > 0 and ul +(lul uh) < uh (lul uh):
It can be easily shown that the two last inequalities simultaneously hold if  < 1
2
auh bul
lul uh ;for any
 2 [a; b] :8 It follows that the admissible set for  that we assume to hold hereafter for any  2 [a; b]
is  < min
n
a ul
huh ul ;
1
2
auh aul
lul uh
o
:
8In fact we have uh   (lul   uh) > 0 or ,  < a uhlul uh ; and ul + (lul   uh) = uh   (lul   uh),
,  < 12 a(uh ul)lul uh where a
uh
lul uh  
1
2
auh aul
lul uh =
1
2a
uh+ul
 uh+lul > 0:
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It is worth noting that, due to the parameter i; i = l; h, the perceived quality of a domestic
good does not coincide with its intrinsic quality: it is as if i would magnify the satisfaction from
consuming a variant, depending on the country where it is produced rather than on its quality.9
In particular, consumers living in country l; while recognizing that the home-made variant has
a lower quality than the foreign good, obtain some utility from consuming ul because this good
satises their sense of place.10
In line with the traditional model of vertical product di¤erentiation, the marginal consumer in
each group h (ph; pl) and l (ph; pl) ; respectively write as
h =
(ph   pl + 2 (ul   huh))
uh   ul and l =
(ph   pl   2uh + 2lul)
uh   ul
In this framework, demand functions faced by rm h and l write, respectively, as
xh(ph; pl) = (b  (ph pl+2(ul huh))uh ul ) + t

b  (ph pl 2uh+2lul)
uh ul

;
xl(ph; pl) =

(ph pl 2uh+2lul)
uh ul   a

+ t( (ph pl+2(ul huh))
uh ul   a):
Maximizing the prot function of rm i; i = xipi; with i = h; l we get the optimal price pi :
ph =
(uh ul)(2b a)
3
+ 

(4t+2h(2 t)+2l)uh+(2t 6 4tl)ul
3(1+t)

pl =
(uh ul)(b 2a)
3
+ (2t+2h+4l 4th)uh+(4t 6 2tl)ul
3t+3
:
The corresponding demand xh and x

l at equilibrium turn out to be
xh =
(2b a)(1+t)(uh ul)
3(uh ul) +
( 2((huh+2lul ul 2uh)t+(3ul 2huh luh)))
3(uh ul)
xl =
(uh ul+tuh tul)(b 2a)
3(uh ul)  
(6uh 2tuh 4tul 2huh+2luh 6lul+4thuh+2tlul)
3(uh ul) :
Direct comparison of the optimal prices ph and p

h denes the threshold ~h   (uh(4t+2l) ul(4tl 2t+6))2uh(2 t)
such that ph = p

h; whereas the direct comparison of p

l and p

l allows to dene the threshold
h  (uh(2t+4l) ul(6 4t+2tl))2uh(2t 1) at which pl = pl : Finally, comparing quantities xl and xl determines
9In a di¤erent perspective, one could consider how the quality gap a¤ects the satisfaction of purchasing a
variant. This case has been disentangled in a setting of international oligopoly by Ceccantoni et al. (2018). In
that analysis, the key feature is that consumption has a conspicuous driver. Choosing a particular variant can
satisfy some material needs on the one hand, and meet a desire of social distinction, on the other hand. Then, the
more di¤erentiated a variant with respect to another one, the wider the social distance between consumers choosing
these variants. In Ben-Elhadj et al. (2015), the quality gap in a vertically di¤erentiated market has been used to
formalize the notion of relative preferences. See also Lombardini (2005) and Mantovani (2016) for an application
to environmental economics.
10The idea that consumers choose a good for satisfying their "social identity" has been discussed at lenght by
McAdams (1992). For di¤erent approaches to relative preferences, see aAkerlof (1997) where the satisfaction of
a consumer increases with the di¤erence between the personal status and others status, Alexopoulos and Sapp
(2006) and Riechmann (2006). In a companion strand of literature Benabou and Tirole (2006) have described the
so called prosocial behavior and identify some social drivers to consumption.
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h =
 (3uh tuh 2tul+luh 3lul+tlul)
uh(2t 1) such that x

l = x

l : As a consequence, in the range of transport
costs t > uh
2ul
with uh < 2ul and l > max fl; lg11 the following result can be stated
Proposition 1 Whenever feelings of satisfaction/frustration generated by home bias in country
h are weak, namely h  ~h; ethnocentrism decreases the price and quantity of the high quality
variant; while increases price and quantity of the low quality good:
When these feelings of satisfaction/frustration are intermediate, namely ~h < h h; ethno-
centrism increases prices and quantities of both goods.
Instead, when these feeling are strong, namely h < h  h, ethnocentrism increases both
prices and only the quantity of the high quality good but it reduces the quantity of the low quality
good.
Finally, when these feeling are very strong, namely h > h; ethnocentrism increases the price
and quantity of the high quality variant; while it decreases price and quantity of the low quality
good.
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is worth noticing that the equilibrium conguration under home-bias in both country is
determined by the sense of place that consumers in each country have when purchasing their do-
mestic variant. A priori, ethnocentric attitudes can push upward prices of variants. Consumers are
willing to pay a price premium for their domestic good which is higher, the higher the satisfaction
the corresponding consumption generates, ceteris paribus. Contrary to what one could guess in a
traditional model of vertical product di¤erentiation, this premium does not univocally depress the
demand of goods. The e¤ects of these ethnocentric drivers depend on the intensity of attachment
that consumers in a country have compared to those living in the other country. If the sense of
place generated by home-bias in country h is intermediate in both countries, then both prices
raise under home bias. This is no longer true, for example, when ethnocentric attitude is weak in
country h while being strong in country l: In this scenario, only the price in country l increase,
while price and quantity in country h decrease. The reverse holds when ethnocentrism is strong
in country h : then, equilibrium price and quantity in this country raise, while those in country l
decrease under home-bias with respect to the baseline.
Our nding that the quantity of the low quality good can be decreasing in ethnocentric feel-
ings is in line with the common wisdom that consumers in developing countries tend to perceive
domestic products as being of lower quality compared to foreign products. Hence, in spite of their
ethnocentric attitude, they tend to favour the purchase of foreign products at expenses of local
ones (Sklair, L. 1994; Wang et al. 2000).
It is interesting to emphasize a further role of h and l: These parameters raise the threshold
value a^ such that for any a < a^ the market turns out to be uncovered. In a traditional vertical
di¤erentiation model, the market is uncovered for a = 0; while being possibly covered whenever
a > 0 in a given range of qualities ui; i = h; l: In our model, the coverage of the market is not
univocally determined by a=b; given ui: It is a¤ected by the intensity of ethnocentric feelings i;
too: the stronger these feelings, the higher the value of a for the market to be covered, whatever
uh and ul:12
11The analysis of the price and quantity comparison in the ranges 0 < t < uh2ul is provided in Appendix B so as
to improve the readibility of the paper. In Appendix B, we dene also l and l:
12See Wauthy (1996) on the choice of quality under endogenous coverage of the market.
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Moreover, our formal approach opens the door to a further conguration that is never observed
under a traditional vertically di¤erentiated market. A priori, in country h; the market can be
monopolized by the local rm.13 Indeed, in this country, the low quality rm is dominated by
the high quality rival not only in terms of intrinsic quality but also of ethnocentric feelings of
consumers. Hence, it may happen that the low-quality rm is not active in market h when the
penalty su¤ered by consumers in this market and captured by the parameter h is so relevant
that consumers refrain from consuming the foreign variant. Interestingly, this conguration can
be observed even in the case when the satisfaction of consumers living in country l and buying
ul is magnied by their ethnocentric feelings. In this scenario, we would observe that market h
is monopolized by rm h in correspondence to a high value of l; regardless of h: The rationale
for this monopolization by rm h; when l is the driver, is that consumers in country l obtain
such a relevant "social" benet when consuming l that they are willing to pay a very high price
premium for ul: The equilibrium price of variant l generated in these circumstances is so high that
consumers living in country h refrain from buying it: their home-bias toward the domestic good
coupled with the high price of the foreign product makes this latter undesirable. As a result, the
market in country h can be monopolized by rm h for a high value of h or l: Moreover, in this
case, the market can be covered or uncovered. Typically, under monopoly the market is never
endogenously covered. In our setting, it can be proved that, for a su¢ ciently high value of b;market
h is monopolized and covered at equilibrium by rm h: Indeed, whenever the average willingness
to pay is high, market coverage does not penalize too much rm h in terms of equilibrium price ph
whose level is kept high by strong ethnocentric feelings either in country h or in country l. When
h is high, the e¤ect of ethnocentric feelings on ph are direct, whereas when l is high, the e¤ect
of ethnocentric feelings in country l on ph are indirect: the higher l; the higher pl and, given that
prices are strategic complements, the higher ph
Comparative statics on the threshold h and ~h reveal the role played by the transportation
costs. It is easy to show that @h
@t
< 0; @~h
@t
< 0 and @h
@t
> 0. If follows that any measure that
intensies international trade (increasing t) decreases h and ~h decreasing the size of the intervals
h < ~h and h < h < h; and it increases h increasing the length of the intermediate interval
~h < h <h. We can then state the following
Proposition 2 A reduction of trade costs enlarges the intermediate interval [~h;h] where ethno-
centrism increases both prices and both quantities.
Di¤erently said, under home bias, any measure of trade liberalization may give a push upwards
to prices of the exchange goods. This is a novel result that is unexpected and opposite to the clas-
sical result in trade theory claiming that trade liberalization lowers prices for the nal consumers.
It remains true that trade liberalization lowers transportation costs leading to a price decrease.
Nonetheless, if we neglect phenomena such as ethnocentrism, we may misinterpret the e¤ect of
international trade on prices and quantities exchanged.
Finally, before moving to the asymmetric scenarii with only one country su¤ering from home
bias, we check the role of the home bias when this phenomenon appears in both countries at the
same intensity namely when l = h = :The following proposition can be stated:
13It holds that h(ph; pl) < f (ph; pl) for any value of pi; i = h; l:
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Corollary 1 Assume home bias shows with the same intensity  in both countries. Home bias
increases both the optimal price and quantity of the high quality good for any : It also always
increases the price of the low quality variant but it decreases the corresponding quantity.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In the following, we explore the e¤ects of home bias when these feelings appear only in one
of the two countries. We rst assume that home bias appear in the country producing the high
quality good.
5 Home bias in country h
In this section, consumers in country h possess the same preferences as in (2). By contrast,
in country l; consumers do not attribute any cultural content to consumption. Accordingly, they
choose the variant depending on the quality and the corresponding price. Thus, the utility function
of a consumer in country l is now
U l () =

uh   ph if she buys h
ul   pl if she buys l :
In this framework, maximizing the prot function of rm i; i = xipi; with i = h; l we get the
optimal price p0i :
p0h =
((t+ 1) (uh   ul) (2b  a)   ( 2ul + 2huh) (t  2))
3t+ 3
p0l =
(b  2a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul)   ( 2ul + 2huh) (2t  1)
3t+ 3
and then the corresponding optimal quantity x0i
x0h =
((2b  a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul))  ( ( 2ul + 2huh) (t  2))
3(uh   ul)
x0l =
(b  2a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul)  (2ul   2huh) (1  2t)
3(uh   ul)
It is interesting to determine the role of home bias and trade costs in determining the new equi-
librium conguration. With respect to home bias scenario, we can write the following:
Proposition 3 Whatever the level of trade costs, home bias raises the equilibrium price of the
high quality variant and the corresponding quantity with respect to the baseline. The equilibrium
price of the low-quality variant and the corresponding quantity increase i¤ the value of trade costs
is not too high (i.e. t  1
2
).
Proof. @p
0
h
@
=
@x0h
@
= 2
3
(huh   ul) 2 tuh ul > 0;
@p0h
@h
=
@x0h
@h
= 2
3
uh
2 t
t+1
> 0
@p0l
@
= 2
3
(1  2t)  ul+huh
t+1
T 0 and @x
0
l
@
= 2
3
(1  2t)  ul+huh
uh ul T 0 , (1  2t) T 0 and
@p0l
@p
=
2
3
uh
1 2t
t+1
T 0 and @x
0
l
@h
= 2uh
1 2t
3uh 3ul T 0, (1  2t) T 0
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The economic intuition underlying the above ndings can be summarized as follows. Due to
the psychological benet that consuming variant h confers to its buyers, under home bias the price
of this variant raises. Still, contrary to the standard case, the corresponding quantity does not
decrease. These feelings enlarge the market share of the high-quality producer, which thus can
obtain higher prots at equilibrium.
Interestingly, the reduction of trade costs and home bias exert opposite e¤ect on the equilibrium
prices. Comparing this equilibrium conguration with the benchmark of open economy enables
to identify the relative strength of these drivers:
Proposition 4 When international trade is not intense, the demand of goods at equilibrium and
the price of the high quality variant are higher under home bias than in the benchmark, whereas
the price of the low-quality variant is higher and the corresponding quantity is lower under home
bias if and only if the value of trade costs is high (t > 1=2).
Proof. p0h   ph = 13 ( 2ul + 2huh) 2 tt+1 > 0; and p0l   pl = 13 ( 2ul + 2huh) 1 2tt+1 > 0 ()
1  2t > 0;
x0h xh =  13 ( 2ul + 2huh) t 2uh ul > 0 and x0l xl = 23 (huh   ul) 2t 1uh ul > 0() 2t 1 > 0:
Hence, as in the scenario analyzed in Section 4, we can conclude that the typical benecial
e¤ect of trade, namely a larger demand at lower price, can be o¤set by a home bias component
of culture. Indeed, when an ethnocentric country producing a high quality good exchange with
country producing a low-quality good, a larger demand of products can come at expenses of higher
prices.
6 Home bias in country l
In this section, we consider an alternative scenario when consumers in country l attribute a
sociocultural content to their consumption and possess preferences (3). We assume that consumers
of good h do not perceive any social driver when choosing what to consume. Thus, their utility
function is
Uh () =

uh   ph if she buys h
ul   pl if she buys l :
In this framework, the optimal price p00i writes as
p
00
h =
(t+ 1) (uh   ul) (2b  a) + 2 (ul   2tul) l + 2uh (2t  1)
3t+ 3
p
00
l =
(t+ 1) (uh   ul) (b  2a) + 2ul (2  t) l   2uh (2  t)
3t+ 3
with p00h > p
00
l ; while the corresponding equilibrium quantity x
00
i ; i = h; l is
x00h =
(2b  a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul) + 2ul (1  2t) l + 2uh (2t  1)
3 (uh   ul)
x00l =
(b  2a) (t+ 1) (uh   ul) + 2ul (2  t) l + 2uh (t  2)
3(uh   ul)
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We can write the following:
Proposition 5 Whatever the level of trade costs, home bias raises the equilibrium price and quan-
tity of the low quality variant with respect to the baseline, while it raises the equilibrium price and
the corresponding quantity of the high quality good if and only if the value of trade costs is not too
high (t  1=2):
Proof. @p

h
@
= 2 (uh   lul) 2t 13t+3 > 0 i¤ 2t  1 < 0;
@ph
@l
  2
3
ul
2t 1
t+1
> 0 i¤ 2t  1 < 0
@pl
@
= 2uh lul
3t+3
(t  2) > 0 and @pl
@l
=  2 ul
3t+3
(t  2) > 0
@xh
@
= 2
3
(lul   uh) 1 2tuh ul > 0 i¤ 2t  1 < 0 and
@xh
@l
=  2
3
ul
2t 1
uh ul > 0 i¤ 2t  1 < 0
@xl
@
= 2
3
(lul   uh) 2 tuh ul > 0;
@xl
@ b
=
@xl
@l
= 2
3
ul
2 t
uh ul > 0
Notice that with respect to the previous scenario, in this case home bias raises the equilibrium
price and the corresponding quantity of the low quality variant. Also, di¤erently from the previous
case, where both the demand were increasing in ; in this setting the demand of the high-quality
good raises i¤ trade is not very liberalized.
When considering the role of trade, given l  ((uh ul)(2b a)+4uh)4ul ; we obtain that
Proposition 6 The reduction of trade costs (i) reduces the price of the high-quality good and the
low quality good; (ii) it increases the quantity sold by rms h and l whenever l < l.
Proof. By simply checking that @p

h
@t
=  2 uh+lul
(t+1)2
< 0;
@pl
@t
= 2lul uh
(t+1)2
< 0;
@xh
@t
=
(2b a)(uh ul) (4lul 4uh)
3(uh ul) > 0 and
@xl
@t
= (b 2a)(uh ul)+(2uh 2lul)
3(uh ul) > 0 i¤l < l 
((uh ul)(2b a)+4uh)
4ul
:
In this case, we observe a kind of symmetric e¤ect with respect to the previous scenario. Both
equilibrium prices decrease with t, while the low-quality variant increases with the reduction of
trade costs if and only if the home bias component is not very strong.
Comparing this equilibrium conguration with the benchmark, we get:
Proposition 7 The demand and the price of the high quality variant are higher under home bias
than in the benchmark if and only if the value of trade costs is relatively low (t  1=2), whereas
the price of the low-quality variant and its corresponding demand are higher under the home bias
scenario than in the benchmark, whatever the level of trade costs.
Proof. Proving that ph   ph = 23 ( uh + lul) 1 2tt+1 > 0 , (1  2t) > 0 while pl   pl =
2
3
 ( uh + lul) 2 tt+1 > 0 and xh  xh = 23 ( uh + lul) 1 2tuh ul > 0, (1  2t) > 0 while xl  xl =
2
3
 ( uh + lul) 2 tuh ul > 0:
It is thus interesting to conclude that the e¤ects of ethnocentric consumption in open economies
change depending on the features of the country where this type of culture is widespread and on
the intensity of international trade. Finally, whether such a consumption culture is shared among
all countries engaged in trade crucially determines how home bias a¤ect prices and quantities
exchanged.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we dene a model with two countries and two vertically di¤erentiated goods, a high
and a low quality variant, and heterogenous consumers with respect to their willingness to pay
for quality. Consumers in one country are ethnocentric in consumption, namely the attribute a
social content to the goods. In particular, they thrive additional satisfaction when consuming a
domestic good rather than a foreign one, since only the former can satisfy their sense of place. By
contrast, they su¤er a psychological penalty if they consume the foreign product. We investigate
the role of trade costs and ethnocentric attitude in shaping the equilibrium conguration of the
international duopoly.
Beyond the fact of providing a model for analyzing home bias, the main result of our analysis
is that home bias consumption increases both the price and the quantity of the domestic good.
The e¤ect on the price and quantity of the foreign good depends on the level of trade costs.
An interesting extension of this analysis is feasible. Here, we exclude the possibility of price
discrimination, which, in our model with rms serving a local and a foreign market, could generate
the so called pricing to market phenomenon. Of course, a priori assuming price discrimination
could change the equilibrium conguration of the market. For example, with respect to the price
conguration holding at equilibrium in the current analysis, each rm i could raise its price pi
in its own local market; thereby taking advantage of ethnocentric feelings of consumers. Still,
it should decrease the price in the foreign market, where it is penalized by home-bias. The net
e¤ect of this price strategy on prots is ambiguous. Two drivers should be taken into account:
a price driver and a demand driver. When considering the price driver, price discrimination, all
else being equal, could generate higher prots at home but less prots in the foreign market. The
demand driver however could counterbalance this e¤ect. A low price for good i in the foreign
market j could enlarge the demand faced by rm i in this market; with eventually a positive
e¤ect on prots. Although this pricing strategy could be reminiscent of dumping and thus been
criticized by a competition policy viewpoint, it could provide some interesting insights on the
possible entry strategies in foreign markets. For the analysis to be even more relevant, one could
relax the assumption that markets share the same support: this source of market asymmetry could
emphasize the role of demand driver with even more intricated results. An in-depth analysis of
this issue is left for future research.
Appendices
Appendix A
Market coverage
We start considering that
ul   pl   (huh   ul) > 0,   uncovh
where, uncovh  (pl ul+huh)ul : At the equilibrium with
pl =
0@ 2auh + buh + 2aul   bul   6ul   2atuh + btuh + 2atul btul + 2tuh + 4tul
+2huh + 4luh   4thuh   2tlul
1A
3t+ 3
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we get that
uncovh (p

l ) =  
1
3

2auh   buh   2aul + bul + 9ul + 2atuh   btuh   2atul
+btul   2tuh   tul   5huh   4luh + thuh + 2tlul

ul (t+ 1)
:
Then, for the market to be covered the following inequality must hold
a 

 1
3
2auh buh 2aul+bul+9ul+2atuh btuh 2atul+btul 2tuh tul 5huh 4luh+thuh+2tlul
ul(t+1)

> 0 or
a > a^ 

buh   bul   9ul + btuh   btul + 2tuh + tul + 5huh + 4luh
 thuh   2tlul

2uh + ul + 2tuh + tul
:
Appendix B
Comparison of prices
Consider rst the optimal price of the high quality variants with home bias ph and without
ph. The di¤erence p

h   ph is positive implying ph > ph i¤
h (2  t)uh + (uh   2tul) l + (2tuh   ul (3  t)) < 0
namely i¤
h < ~h 
(2tul   uh) l + ((3  t)ul   2tuh)
uh (2  t) :
For h < ~h to be not empty, it must hold that ~h > 1; which is the case i¤ (2tul   uh) l +
(3ul   2uh   tuh   tul) > 0: To study this last inequality we proceed by steps. Dene rst ~l 
(3ul 2uh tuh tul)
 (2tul uh) . Then,
- If 2tul   uh > 0 \ (3ul   2uh   tuh   tul) < 0; namely i¤ t > uh2ul and l > ~l ; then ~h > 1:
- If 2tul   uh < 0 \ (3ul   2uh   tuh   tul) > 0 namely i¤ t < 3ul 2uhuh+ul and l < ~l ; then
~h > 1:
- If 2tul   uh < 0 \ (3ul   2uh   tuh   tul) < 0 namely i¤ 3ul 2uhuh+ul < t <
uh
2ul
; then ~h < 1 and
ph < p

h for any h and l:
Consider now the optimal prices for the low quality variant pl and p

l . The di¤erence p

l   pl
is positive implying pl > p

l i¤
uh (1  2t) h + (2uh   tul) l + (tuh   3ul + 2tul) < 0
Dene h  (uh(2t+4l) ul(6 4t+2tl))2uh(2t 1) and l 
ul(3 2t) tuh
2uh tul :To identify the range of parameters where
the above inequality holds, we look at four di¤erent cases:
- When t > 1=2 and l > l; then p

l > p

l i¤  > h:
- When t > 1=2 and l < l; then p

l > p

l for any admissible h:
- When t < 1=2 and l > l; then never p

l > p

l : For any h, p

l < p

l :
- When t < 1=2 and l < l; then p

l > p

l i¤  < h:
For the purpose of Proposition 1, we focus the attention in the interval t > uh
2ul
where the sign
of the di¤erence ph   ph and pl   pl is ruled by the size of h: Comparing h and ~h under the
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conditions: t > uh
2ul
; with uh < 2ul we have h   ~h = 3
l(uh t2ul)+t2uh ul
uh(2t 1)(2 t) which is always positive
for any l implying that h > ~h:
To conclude, in the set t > uh
2ul
with uh < 2ul and l > max f~l; lg ; then
 If 1 < h < ~h home bias decreases ph and increases pl
 If ~h < h < h home bias increases both prices
 If h > h home bias increases ph but decreases pl
Comparison of quantities
Consider now the comparison of the optimal quantities xh and x

l with x

h and x

l ; respectively.
We have xl   xl > 0 i¤
2
3

(3uh   tuh   2tul   huh + +luh   3lul + 2thuh + tlul)
uh   ul > 0,
uh (2t  1) h + ((uh   3ul + tul) l + ((3  t)uh   2tul)) > 0
Two cases must be analysed:
1. If t < 1=2 then xl  xl > 0 i¤ h h   (3uh tuh 2tul+luh 3lul+tlul)uh(2t 1) : The threshold value
h is higher than one if l >l   (2( uh+tul) tuh)(3ul tul uh) > 1:
2. If t > 1=2, then xl   xl > 0 i¤ h >  (3uh tuh 2tul+luh 3lul+tlul)uh(2t 1)  h: The threshold
value h is higher than one if l >l   (2( uh+tul) tuh)(3ul tul uh) ; where ~l <l and h >h > ~h:
Hence if t < 1=2; l >l and h h then xl  xl > 0: Otherwise, when t > 1=2; xl  xl > 0
for any l >l and h >h:
Now consider xh and x

h where
xh   xh =
2
3

(3ul   2tuh   tul   2huh   luh + thuh + 2tlul)
uh   ul
It follows that xh > x

h i¤
(3ul   2tuh   tul   2huh   luh + thuh + 2tlul) > 0
,
h (2  t)uh + (uh   2tul) l + (2tuh   ul (3  t)) < 0
The above inequality coincides with the inequality that denes ph > p

h : Hence, it can be readily
checked that in the set t > uh
2ul
; xh ? xh i¤ h 7 ~h; where the analysis of size of ~h is as developed
above for the comparison of ph and p

h :
To conclude, in the set t > uh
2ul
; with uh < 2ul, l > max f~l; lg ; then
 If 1 < h < ~h home bias decreases ph and xh and increases pl and xl
 If ~h < h <h home bias increases both prices and both quantities
 If h < h < h home bias increases both prices and xh but decreases pl
 If h > h home bias increases ph and xh and decreases pl and xl
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Appendix C
Consider here the scenario h = l = :
ph > p

h i¤
 (2  t)uh + (uh   2tul)  + (2tuh   ul (3  t)) < 0
,
(uh (3  t)  2tul)  + (2tuh   ul (3  t)) < 0
h < ~ 
ul (3  t)  2tuh
uh (3  t)  2tul < 1:
Therefore, for any admissible value of , ph < p

h : home bias increases the price of the high
quality good.
pl > p

l i¤
uh (1  2t)  + (2uh   tul)  + (tuh   3ul + 2tul) < 0
,
((3  2t)uh   tul)  + (tuh + (2t  3)ul) < 0
h <  
  (tuh + (2t  3)ul)
(3  2t)uh   tul < 1:
Therefore, for any admissible value of , pl < p

l : home bias increases the price of the low quality
good.
xh > x

h i¤
((2  t)uh + (uh   2tul))  + (2tuh   ul (3  t)) < 0
,
 < ~  ul (3  t)  2tuh
uh (3  t)  2tul < 1:
Therefore, for any admissible value of , xh < x

h : home bias increases the quantity of the
high quality good.
xl > x

l i¤
uh (2t  1)  + ((uh   3ul + tul)  + ((3  t)uh   2tul)) > 0
,
(2tuh   (3  t)ul)  + ((3  t)uh   2tul) > 0
 >    ((3  t)uh   2tul)
(2tuh   (3  t)ul) < 1
Therefore, for any admissible value of , xl > x

l : home bias decreases the quantity of the low
quality good.
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